Why do non-state actors distribute welfare? Incentives, incentives, incentives
Cammett, who is currently Professor of Government at Harvard University, argues that parties within national institutions are theoretically obliged to provide non-discriminatory access to services. The efficiency and honesty of that can be argued, however, there are certain "normative pressures to serve all citizens regardless of sect because their resources are derived from national collective institutions" 1 . Thus, the question that Cammett wanted to answer lies in why would non-state actors that use their own resources choose sometimes to serve constituents outside their sectarian groups. She sees that incentives are the main shaper of whether non-state actors distribute welfare strictly within their constituents or delve into outgroup constituents.
According to Cammett's quantitative and qualitative research in Lebanon, state-centric parties tend to distribute benefits to both in-group and out-group communities. Since those parties are more concerned with national elections and power over formal institutions of the state, they will reach out to a wider audience. This is also because the Lebanese electoral system is based on sect-allocated seats that are voted for from multi-sectarian districts.
By the same logic, extra-state parties have less reasons to serve out-group communities and thus their welfare services are reserved to their loyal supporters. Extra-state parties are not interested in the process of electoral politics.
